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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The actual implementation of the PGV Emergency Response Plan went
reasonably well. Concern from fire and police personnel over
health risks and confusion on the part of citizens over how to
proceed during the on and off again alert notification in the
Leilani Estates Subdivision were a cause for some difficulty
during the response. Confusion over the applicability of
temporary housing cost reimbursement in relation to the 3,500
feet perimeter and the function of the PGV Employee Alarm System
also served to exacerbate the stressful nature of the emergency
response to the blowout. Nonetheless, the evacuation and alert
were successful.
Based on the experience of the 12 June 1991 upset incident, the
PGV Emergency Response Plan should be reviewed and revised
appropriately. Such a review should henceforth be conducted
annually, along with exercising the plan.
The Pahoa Community needs to understand how these issues are
resolved so there is no confusion in the event of another upset.
Emergency air monitoring, concern over emergency H2S action
levels and PGV emergency notification are other areas that
require review and improvement.
The following summary recommendations are provided based upon a
preliminary review of the 12 June 1991, response to the PGV well
blowout:
1. The Department of Health (DOH) should complete a
revised analysis of the hazard of an uncontrolled
venting of the PGV Well.
2. DOH should complete a health review of the warning,
alert, and emergency action levels for H2S.
3. DOH should complete a review of H2S monitoring
capability and procedures for upset conditions.
4. Upon completion of 1 through 3 of the above, the Hawaii
State Emergency Response Commission and Hawaii County
Local Emergency Planning Committee should review,
revise and exercise the PGV Emergency Response Plan.
5. The Hawaii County Planning Department should resolve
confusion over housing reimbursement and the function
of the PGV employee alarm system.
6. PGV should review notification procedures and provide
appropriate verbal and written notification to ensure
compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986.
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I. BACKGROUND
In July of 1990, after seven months of review, the Emergency
Response Plan for the Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) 25 MW
Power Project Geothermal Resource Permit: GRP 87-2 was
accepted by Hawaii County and Hawaii state government
agencies to fulfill permit requirements. Approximately one
year later at 11:06 p.m. on 12 June 1991, an uncontrolled
flow event at the PGV Well activated the Emergency Response
Plan. During the approximately 31 hours of the release,
PGV, County and state agencies, and volunteer organizations
worked with citizens to respond to the release, evacuate
households in the Lani Puna Gardens, alert residents in the
Leilani Estates Subdivision and, provide shelter and
security, while the release was being brought under control.
Another important factor in the response was conflicting
information that may have caused confusion. During and
after the response, questions by citizens were raised over
reimbursable costs for emergency response, the function of
the PGV alarm, and the general applicability of the 3,500
foot perimeter as defined in the Geothermal permit, and
other issues that relate to this incident. For example,
under the permit, PGV is required to reimburse community
members that must be relocated for a controlled venting if
they are within the 3,500 foot perimeter. PGV is not
required to reimburse community members for relocation costs
for uncontrolled venting during emergencies, etc.
PGV has an employee alarm system at their facility for their
own emergency use. The alarm is not meant to be used by
citizens for their notification purposes. Nonetheless, a
number of citizens have expressed concerns that they did not
believe that the alarm system worked properly so that they
were notified of the emergency. Other citizens have noted
that PGV did not use the alarm in all events when they
should have.
Finally it should be noted that the PGV Emergency Plan had
never been exercised and this is the first time a geothermal
release has prompted an evacuation in Hawaii. Therefore,
this is the first time the emergency response plan has been
evaluated based on an exercise or an actual experience and
affords an opportunity for PGV Emergency Response Plan
improvement.
II. REVIEW OF RESPONSE AND DISCUSSION
A. Sequence of Events
A brief review of the essential sequence of events that
occurred during the response is included in Appendix I.
It is not complete, but provides a general outline of
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the key events that occurred. A summary of Appendix I
is provided below.
Wednesday, 12 June 1991
At 23:06 PGV reports the well blowout occurred. At
23:15 a citizen notified Hawaii Fire Department
(HFD) of a possible Geothermal venting or upset
event. HFD immediately notified Hawaii Civil
Defense (HCD). PGV contacted HCD at 23:25. At
23:34 PGV requested HFD provide an ambulance for two
minor injuries. At 23:45 Hawaii Police Department
(HPD) reported a 60 foot steam cloud from the Well,
wind coming from the southeast and headed for the
Pohiki area.
At 23:30 HPD arrived on-scene at the pre-designated
command post, a third of a mile east of the Well
head.
At 23:55 HCD requested Department of Health (DOH)
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) monitoring support. DOH
estimated a time of arrival to the command post at
01:30.
Thursday, 13 June 1991
At 00:10 HPD commenced evacuation of Lani Puna
Gardens based on recommendation by PGV. HFD noted
that they were not notified of this event. HCD
noted that this was due in part to the fact that the
evacuation was for a small number of households (5).
At 00:50 HCD contacted HFD at the Emergency
Operations Center, Hawaii civil Defense Agency,
Hilo, Hawaii.
At 00:50 HCD contacted the Red Cross to open the
shelter at the Pahoa Community Center based on the
Lani Puna evacuation.
At 01:00 PGV reported first monitoring data just
outside the fence line of the perimeter of the well
site, 20 parts per million (ppm) of H2S, and a
second reading 29 ppm of H2S.
At 01:10, DOH monitoring staff contacted the Deputy
Director for Environmental Health, who recommended
proposed H2S action levels be used as guidance in
protecting pUblic health. It was recommended that
the residents be relocated if H2S levels are likely
to exceed 10 ppm as a one hour average.
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At 01:25 DOH monitoring from Lanipuna street
reported less that .5 ppm H2S (the limit of
detection for the Dreager tube being used).
At 01:13 a house-to-house alert was initiated by HFD
as requested by HCD. This alert was for the 230
homes in the Leilani Estates Subdivision. These are
approximately one-acre lots and the houses are
spread far apart, therefore it took a substantial
amount of time to notify each household.
At 01:30 the Red Cross reported that the Pahoa
Neighborhood Center Shelter was open and, at 01:37
roadblocks were established by HPD at three points
to control traffic near the effected area.
At 02:15 HCD requested HFD to stop the house-to-
house alerts in the Leilani Estates SUbdivision.
This decision was based on the determination that
the situation required reevaluation and a review and
coordination of the alert message that was being
provided to the Leilani Estates SUbdivision
residents by HFD.
At 05:00 HCD notified all radio stations of the
Alert Advisory Status of surrounding residential
areas for any individuals that may be experiencing
any unacceptable nuisance or health effects from the
release and that persons should report to the Pahoa
Neighborhood Center. A copy of the announcement is
attached in Appendix B. At 05:15 HCD, based on
their reevaluation, determined that the uncontrolled
venting would be prolonged and that the house-to-
house alert should be continued. At 09:15 the
house-to-house alert was completed.
Friday, 14 June 1991
At 06:30, PGV reports the well had been shut in.
B. Release Notification
At 23:06 PGV reports that the uncontrolled flow event
began. PGV then notified HCD at 23:25. Therefore,
estimated time required for PGV to notify response
authorities initially was approximately 19 minutes.
During this time, PGV reports that they were moving
injured workers away from the drilling rig and securing
the immediate area around the rig.
Notification of releases of H2S above the reportable
quantity (RQ) of 100 pounds in a 24-hour period should
be provided to the National Response Center (NRC), State
Emergency Response Commission (SERC), and the Local
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Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) under Section 304,
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986. By contacting HCD, PGV met notification for the
LEPC. PGV requested HCD to contact DOH in order to
comply with requirements for State Emergency Response
Commission notification. PGV did not notify the NRC.
As of 22 June 1991, the State Emergency Response
Commission did not receive a written follow up
notification of the H2S release.
The release of H2S most likely exceeded the RQ.
C. site Response By PGV
PGV secured the site and only allowed authorized
personnel to enter the site. PGV's site response based
on limited information appears to have been conducted
appropriately, at least in regards to security and
coordination with agency personnel. Further evaluation
of alternative technologies to control a well kick, and
well venting in the event of an uncontrolled release
should be conducted and is being pursued concurrently by
a state funded team of experts.
It should be noted that for a certain period of time it
has been reported that in order to control the well, the
venting was directed horizontally, instead of
vertically. Therefore, based on the PGV site response,
a hazard analysis should include horizontal, as well as,
vertical venting to determine more accurately the
potential of H2S concentrations that might be generated
in the surrounding community from such a release.
HFD expressed concerns over the possible need for a
rescue of injured personnel during a well head venting
if a PGV rescue could not be conducted. Potential for
personal protection equipment contamination from well
steam indicates decontamination for first responders is
also an issue. These concerns should be investigated
further to determine the likelihood of this occurring,
and appropriate planning completed based on this
analysis.
D. Agency Notification
As described in Appendix I, it appears agency
notification worked exceptionally well for this
response, in that, HCD, HPD, HFD, DOH, and ARC were
immediately notified in a timely manner and, based on
distances to be traveled, responded to the appropriate
locations in a timely fashion.
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E. Public Alert Notification and Evacuation
Generally, public notification went well.
The high H2S (20 and 29 ppm) concentrations reported at
01:00 supported HCD's decision to initiate alert
notification procedures for residents in Leilani
Estates. HFD implemented the alert notification in
Leilani Estates 13 minutes after the HCD request.
Eleven minutes later, at 01:25 DOH reported less than .5
ppm H2S on Lanipuna street. It appears that H2S
concentrations may have declined rapidly after the
initial release.
Subsequent to the incident, citizens expressed concern
over confusion as to exactly what was happening and
where they should have been directed. Review of the
verbal message provided by HFD staff conducting the
house to house evacuation indicates that the reports
were clear and appropriate.
since the alert advisory of Leilani Estates was
initiated at 01:13 it appears that the radio stations
should have been notified of the advisory at this time.
This may have reduced the amount of citizen confusion.
At 05:00 HCD notified the radio stations of the
evacuation.
The on again, off again nature of the alert advisory
probably caused some confusion on the part of citizens.
The alert was suspended from 02:15 to 05:15, a total of
two hours. It should also be noted that HFD and HPD
personnel expressed concerns about their potential
exposure to H2S during the evacuation and alert
notification process.
The actual evacuation and sheltering was executed in a
reasonable manner and was generally successful.
American Red Cross personnel noted along with police and
fire, that the persons that reported to the shelter had
expectations for better provisions for the evacuees,
such as blankets, ear protection, funds for temporary
housing costs, and other support would be provided on-
scene. such arrangements had not been made. It should
be noted that nationally, and in Hawaii such prearranged
evacuation supplies are not stock piled at predetermined
evacuation shelters due to the cost and the difficulty
of knowing where an appropriate shelter location might
be.
It appears that there is a variety of opinion on what
should be provided to the citizens in the event of an
evacuation caused by a uncontrolled geothermal venting
release.
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In addition, confusion on the part of many citizens as
to what they are entitled to regarding reimbursement for
cost associated with geothermal evacuation also led to
high expectations.
PGV is not required to reimburse Hawaii County for
emergency response costs in the event of an uncontrolled
well venting. During the emergency, PGV was approached
by a limited number of citizens at the command post for
assistance in temporary housing costs because citizens
needed money in order to rent hotels, etc. PGV did
provide certain individuals with money so they could
relocate during the emergency. This may have caused
confusion because PGV provided funds for temporary
housing costs despite the fact that they were not
required to under the permit.
F. Emergency Air Quality Monitoring
Interviews and reviews of emergency monitoring data
indicates that government emergency response monitoring
capability is currently insufficient. In addition,
health, police, and fire personnel indicated some
uncertainty in understanding of H2S hazards and methods
for monitoring and detection.
DOH monitoring with Draeger Colormetric Tubes and
utilizing a portable Colortec monitor were not
completely sufficient for emergency response needs.
Because of the stationary nature of the ambient air
quality monitoring stations, these instruments can be
considered supplemental to portable emergency response
monitoring instruments.
A separate element of the review of this incident will
evaluate the adequacy of the air and noise monitoring
program.
There was a substantial delay between the original
notification of the release at 23:25 and the first
report of monitoring results at 01:00. Along with
immediate health and safety issues monitoring should
have been initiated and results reported in a timely
fashion since H2S monitoring is also an immediate health
and safety issue when an upset condition occurs.
PGV monitoring was provided using a Jerome 631x
monitoring unit which provides real time digital read
out of H2S concentrations. Real Time digital readout
monitoring is more appropriate for emergency response
needs and can be supplemented by an alarm type monitor
that can be triggered if concentrations exceed a
predetermined level. More appropriate monitoring
instrumentation should be provided to health and fire
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personnel. Special consideration should be made for
community wide DOH monitoring needs versus site entry,
rescue, and safety monitoring needs of HFD.
G. Adequacy of Department of Health Alert, Warning and
Emergency Action Level
It appears that there is still some concern as to the
adequacy of the currently established Alert, Warning and
Emergency Action Levels for H2S as established under the
PGV permit and included in the PGV emergency response
plan.
Agency personnel as well as, many citizens certainly
experienced a substantial nuisance from low
concentrations of H2S. Based on health effects
reported, including headache, nausea, dizziness,
respiratory irritation, and others, a re-evaluation of
the emergency levels is indicated. It is important to
note that well noise, stress caused by the incident,
along with other pollutants in the venting steam may
have contributed to the effect sensitive persons may
have experienced from H2S exposure.
It was reported that one police officer out of the four
involved in the evacuation became ill from exposure to
H2S and therefore had to be pUlled back from
implementing the Lani Puna Gardens evacuation.
Sensitive individuals have to be considered in the
implementation of evacuation and the establishment of
action levels.
H. Community Relations and Emergency Preparedness
Community relations is important in regards to the
execution of an emergency response. Citizen cooperation
and understanding is essential if a proper and efficient
emergency response is to be implemented. Many citizens
as well as agency personnel were confused the night of
the emergency. This confusion would be minimized
through a better understanding of the policies and
procedures relating to the emergency response plan.
Increased communication between PGV citizens and state
and county agencies and non-profit agencies is required
in order to improve the response. It should be noted
that the Hawaii Planning Department did make the PGV
Emergency Plan available for pUblic review.
III. CONCLUSIONS
This limited evaluation identified a number of areas for
response improvement. Other issues require further studies
or a long term evaluation.
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A fundamental element of a complete evaluation is a careful
analysis of the actual concentrations of H2S reported
through out the PGV area and the surrounding community
during the upset conditions compared to the modelled
concentrations that were predicted in the emergency response
plan. Generally, based on a preliminary evaluation of the
data the concentrations of H2S throughout the community were
within the ranges of modelled or predicted values estimated
in the hazard evaluation portion of the PGV Emergency
Response plan. One exception stands out and that is the
reported 22 and 29 ppm concentrations at the fence perimeter
of the PGV facility.
Those high numbers supported the determination to follow
through on the evacuation of Lani Puna Gardens, although the
evacuation was initiated before monitoring results were
received by HCD. It can not be assumed that the monitoring
capability generally available in an emergency response will
capture the highest concentrations of contaminants that
actually occur during an emergency. This must be considered
for planning, and response purposes.
Further investigation of monitoring data is required, and
has already been initiated as a special study review of
actual recorded data during the event, along with
micrometeorological and aerometric analysis of the area
surrounding the PGV facility.
This re-evaluation of the hazard may require a revision to
the estimated hazard posed by a free flow venting of the
well. A hazard analysis determines how an emergency
response plan should be written and what resources should be
prestaged for response and mitigation. Based on a revised
hazard analysis, using all available information, the plan
should be reviewed and revised appropriately. A review and
if necessary revision of the plan along with exercising
should be an annual activity in order to keep the plan
operational and effective.
Emergency response monitoring capabilities need to be
sUbstantially upgraded. DOH and HFD personnel should be
equipped to provide real time monitoring for their emergency
response purposes. Redundancy in capability is required.
PGV should establish procedures to begin monitoring and
report results in a more timely fashion. The procedures
should be addressed in the PGV plan. A separate study
currently under way evaluating monitoring capability should
expand on this issue and provide details on adequate
monitoring capability.
PGV should evaluate its response capability for uncontrolled
venting and should include capability to prevent and control
any upset condition. PGV exceeded the RQ for H2S under
section 304 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
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to-Know Act of 1986, and should complete additional
notification as required. PGV notification procedures
should be reviewed and revised to ensure complete and timely
direct notification to all appropriate agencies.
If possible, pUblic notification of an evacuation by radio
should complement the timing for evacuations. This could
serve to reduce confusion for evacuees, although awakening
in the middle of a deep sleep to receive an evacuation or
alert notice can be a cause of confusion in itself.
A complete review of the Alert Warning and Emergency Action
Levels should be conducted by the DOH. Special
consideration of low level nuisance effects on sensitive
individuals is required. Upon completion of DOH's review of
response levels, county and citizen representatives should
be informed of DOH's findings and training provided to
review how the levels should be used.
The actual implementation of the PGV Emergency Response Plan
went reasonably well. Concern from fire and police
personnel over health risks and confusion on the part of
citizens over how to proceed during the on and off again
alert notification in the Leilani Estates SUbdivision were a
cause for some difficulty during the response. Nonetheless,
the evacuation and alert were successful. Based on the
experience of the 12 June 1991 upset incident, the PGV
Emergency Response Plan should be reviewed and revised
appropriately. Such a review should henceforth be conducted
annually, along with exercising the plan.
Confusion over the applicability of temporary housing cost
reimbursement in relation to the 3,500 feet perimeter and
the function of the PGV Employee Alarm System also served to
exacerbate the stressful nature of the emergency response to
the blowout. The purpose of these provisions in the permit
should be revisited by the County Planning Department's
committee that originally reviewed these issues. The Pahoa
community needs to understand how these issues are resolved
so there is no confusion in the event of another upset.
The expectation of free hotel housing for some of the
citizens may have played a role in the way the American Red
Cross Shelter was received. Some individuals were expecting
more than the standard, basic support than was provided at
the Puna Neighborhood Center, and is provided nationally.
The following recommendations should provide a framework to
improve the PGV Emergency Response Plan, reduce
difficulties, and create a means for the pUblic and private
agencies, citizens and PGV to be better prepared for a well
upset.
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IV. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A. DOH Should Comolete a Revised Analysis of the Hazard of
an Uncontrolled Venting of the PGV Well.
All emergency response H2S monitoring data should be
compiled and reviewed, and compared to initial modeling
data. An analysis of the predicted H2S hazard based
upon the results of the actual field monitoring data
should be used to complete a revised hazard analysis.
The revised hazard analysis should be included in the
PGV Emergency Response Plan. The analysis should
address horizontal venting. This recommendation has
already been initiated simultaneous to this emergency
response review.
B. DOH Should Complete a Health Review of the Warning,
Alert and Emergency Action Levels for H2~'
The Warning, Alert and Emergency Levels for H2S should
be re-evaluated for their adequacy, particularly as they
relate to nuisance levels and sensitive individuals.
Other stressors such as noise, stress from the emergency
and other pollutants in the well stearn should be
included in the review. A review and training on these
and other pertinent levels should be provided to
appropriate agencies. The review should also address
the need for HFD rescue backup for PGV workers at the
well site, and decontamination issues in the event of an
HFD site entry.
C. DOH Should Complete a Review of H2S Monitoring
Capability and Procedures for Upset Conditions.
Emergency H2S monitoring capability and procedures for
county, state, and PGV should be reviewed, upgraded and
revised as appropriate. This recommendation has already
been initiated simultaneous to this emergency response
review. Timeliness of PGV monitoring at the site should
be addressed. Specific monitoring needs of DOH and HFD
should be considered
D. The Hawaii State Emergency Resoonse Commission and the
Hawaii County Local Emergency Response Commission Should
Review. Revise and Exercise the PGV Emergency Response
Plan.
The PGV Emergency Response Plan, should be revised based
upon 1-3 above. The plan should be updated by PGV and
submitted to the Hawaii State Emergency Response
Commission and the Hawaii Local Emergency Planning
Committee on an annual basis. The plan should be
exercised annually.
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E. The Hawaii County Department of Planning Should Resolve
Confusion Over Housing Reimbursement and the Function of
the PGV Employee Alarm System.
The Hawaii County Department of Planning through its
original committee that included community
representation should revisit temporary housing cost
reimbursement issues, the use of the PGV employee alarm
system and applicability of the 3,500 perimeter as they
pertain to the PGV permit. An effective education and
information effort should be conducted to ensure the
Pahoa community is aware of the final out come of this
review.
F. PGV Should Review Notification Procedures and Provide
Appropriate Verbal and written Notification to Ensure
Compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986.
Amounts of H2S released from the PGV well most likely
exceeded the reportable quantity of 100 pounds which
requires mandatory reporting. To ensure compliance, PGV
should provide verbal and written notification to the
appropriate agencies for this and any future upset
conditions.
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TIME/DATE
APPENDIX I
Sequence of Events of 12 June 1991
Uncontrolled Geothermal Venting
ACTION/EVENT
Wednesday, 12 June 1991
23:06
23:15
23:17
23:25
23:30
23:34
23:35
23:36
23:40
23:45
23:55
Well Blowout occurred.
Public notified Hawaii Fire Department (HFD) of
possible Geothermal venting.
HFD notified Hawaii civil Defense (HCD).
PGV notified HCD; HCD called out CD4.
HPD arrived on scene.
Puna Geothermal Venture ~e9Ue~ted HFD for
ambulance for two minor lnJurles at PGV.
Meanwhile Hawaii Fire Department (HFD) arrives on
scene.
HCD activated Emergency operating Center (EOC).
Opened operations in Hilo office.
HCD CD dispatched staff to predesignated command
post.
HPD-Puna reported major blowout with steam cloud
60 feet high.
PGV reported 60 feet steam cloud from well,
southeast winds headed toward Pohiki.
HCD requested Department of Health (DOH)
monitoring support. DOH reports estimated time of
arrival at command post of 01:30. HCD also
requested another DOH personnel to report to the
EOC.
Thursday, 13 June 1991
00:10
00:30
Police commenced evacuation of Lani Puna Gardens
based on PGV recommendation.
HCD arrives on scene brief by PGV, no H2S,
monitoring data reported from PGV.
r00:50
01:00
01:10
01:13
01:25
01:30
01:37
02:15
05:00
05:15
09:15
HCD requested American Red Cross (ARC) to open
Pahoa Neighbor Center (PNC) for temporary
sheltering.
PGV reports first monitoring data from just
outside fence line perimeter at well site. First
reading 20ppm H2S, second reading 29ppm. PGV
requests HCD to notify DOH to meet notification
requirements.
DOH monitoring staff contacts Deputy Director for
Environmental Health who recommends proposed
action levels by used as guidance to protect
public health. Residents should be relocated if
H2S levels exceed 10ppm one hour average.
House to house "Alert status" notification of the
Leilani Estate Subdivision was initiated by HFD as
requested by HCD.
DOH monitoring from Lanipuna Street reports less
than .5ppm H2S.
ARC reported shelter open at PNC; Fifty citizens
registered. All agencies represented at the HCD
EOC.
Road blocks securing the PGV well established by
HPD at three points on request by CD.
HCD requests HFD to stop house to house alert in
Leilani Estates Subdivision.
HCD notified all radio stations there was a
voluntary evacuation notification and that persons
should report to the PNC.
HCD determined the release would be prolonged and
that the house to house alert should be continued.
HFD completed the house to house alert of Leilani
Estates Subdivision is completed.
Friday, 14 June 1991
06:30 PGV reports well is shut in.
